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Abstract. We propose an new one-round implicitly authenticated three-party protocol that ex-
tends Joux’s protocol as well as a two-party identity-based protocol. Our protocols have a single
communication round that consists of ephemeral (one-time) public keys along with certificates
in the tripartite protocol, and identities in the identity-based setting. As such our protocols are
communication efficient and furthermore do not require enhanced message format.
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1 Introduction
Joux [3,4] proposed one-round three-party key agreement protocol that extended the well known
unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol [2]. Al-Riyami and Patterson [1] attempted to adapt
well-known two-party protocols using Joux’s technique to provide authentication. However, some
of the utilized two-party protocols have known vulnerabilities which were also present in the
resulting three-party protocols; and others relied on protocols that do not have formal security
arguments even for the two-pass variants. We present a new protocol that uses postponed
ephemeral key derivation and pseudo-static keys [7].
Sakai et. al. [5] first considered a two-party pairing-based protocol. The protocol is analogous
to the two-party static Diffie-Hellman protocol and as such does not have many desirable security
goals. We propose a new identity-based protocol that has most desirable security attributes
expected from two-party key agreement protocols.
Notation. In the remainder G denotes a group of prime order q generated by P ; the non-identity
elements are denoted by G∗. The protocol takes place between three-parties: Alice, Bob and
Charlie with static key pairs (a,A = aP ), (b, B = bP ), and (c, C = cP ), respectively; a, b, c ∈
[1, q]. The ephemeral (one-time) key pairs are (x,X = xP ), (y, Y = yP ), and (z, Z = zP ),
respectively; x, y, z ∈ [1, q]. Let e : G→ G˜ be a non-degenerate pairing from the group G into a
group G˜, see e.g., [6] for details. Lastly, H, H ′ and H ′′ denote hash functions viewed as random
oracles.
Security assumptions. For security of the protocols we require the bilinear Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption which roughly states that given (U, V,W ) ∈ G3 it is infeasible to compute e(P, P )uvw
in polynomial time where U = uP , V = vP , and W = wP .
2 Tripartite protocol
We describe our protocol proposal and provide intuitive arguments for its security.
2.1 Description
We describe the actions of the first party Alice; her peers Bob and Charlie perform similar steps.
Alice proceeds as follows:
Initialization. Perform the steps:
1. Select an ephemeral private key x ∈R [1, q] and compute X = xP .
2. Create a session state contains (x,X).
Communication. Upon receiving (start, Alice,Bob, Charlie) Alice performs:
1. Activate a new session instance (Alice,Bob, Charlie, x,X)
2. Broadcasts (1|Alice,Bob, Charlie,X).
Derivations. Upon receiving (1|Alice,Bob, Charlie, Y ) and (1|Alice,Bob, Charlie, Z), Alice
does the following:
1. Verify that Y,Z ∈ G∗.
2. Compute FA = H ′(X), FB = H ′(Y ) and FC = H ′(Z).
3. Compute
σ0 = (e(Y +B,Z + C))
x+FAa = (e(P, P ))(x+FAa)(y+b)(z+c)
σ1 = (e(Y + FBB,Z + C))
x+a = (e(P, P ))(x+a)(y+FBb)(z+c)
σ2 = (e(Y +B,Z + FCC))
x+a = (e(P, P ))(x+a)(y+b)(z+FCc)
σ3 = (e(Y + FBB,Z + FCC))
x+FAa = (e(P, P ))(x+FAa)(y+FBb)(z+FCc).
4. Compute
κ = H(σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, Alice,X,Bob, Y, Chalie, Z).
Completion. To complete the session Alice does
1. Destroy session state.
2. Complete the session by accepting session key κ.
Optionally, the parties may perform key confirmation before accepting the session key.
2.2 Security arguments
In the random oracle model the idea of the security argument is use an adversary that distin-
guishes the session key from a randomly chosen key to solver a BDH instance. The adversary is
intuitively allowed to obtain any private information that does not contain both ephemeral and
static private key of a party. In other words the adversary is not given at least one of the private
keys for every party. One of the group elements in the BDH instance is assigned as the public
key for which the adversary is not given the corresponding private key. In the random oracle
model the adversary has to query the oracle with the shared secrets to distinguish the session
key from a randomly chosen session key. Since there are four shared secrets whose exponents
are linearly independent a simulator can extract the BDH solution from the shared secrets.
3 Identity-based protocol
In this section we present the identity-based protocol. We assume there is a key generation
center that publishes a master static public key S; the corresponding master secret is s such
that S = sP . The public key corresponding to the identity Alice is A = H ′′(Alice), similarly,
Bob’s public key is B = H ′′(Bob). The static private keys of Alice and Bob are Sa = sA and
Sb = sB, respectively.
3.1 Description
We describe the actions of the first party Alice; her peer Bob performs similar steps. Alice
proceeds as follows:
Initialization. Perform the steps:
1. Select an ephemeral private key x ∈R [1, q] and compute X = xP .
2. Create a session state contains (x,X).
Communication. Upon receiving (start, Alice,Bob) Alice performs:
1. Send X to Bob.
Derivations. Upon receiving Y from Bob Alice does the following:
1. Verify that Y ∈ G∗.
2. Compute FA = H ′(X) and FB = H ′(Y ).
3. Compute
σ0 = e(xS + Sa, Y + FBB) = (e(P, P ))
s(x+a)(y+FBb)
σ1 = e(xS + FaSa, Y +B) = (e(P, P ))
s(x+FAa)(y+b)
σ2 = xY = xyP.
4. Compute
κ = H(σ0, σ1, σ2, Alice,X,Bob, Y ).
Completion. To complete the session Alice does
1. Destroy session state.
2. Complete the session by accepting session key κ.
Optionally, the parties may perform key confirmation before accepting the session key.
3.2 Security arguments
As before in the random oracle model a simulator will extract a solution for the BDH challenge
from adversary’s H queries. As before for the test session for each peer the adversary does
not possess either the ephemeral of the static private key. If the adversary has all static keys
then by setting X = V and Y = U the simulator can solve the BDH challenge by computing
e(σ2,W ) = e(P, P )uvw. It remains to consider the case where the adversary either sets or queries
for an ephemeral private key, without loss of generality we can assume the adversary sets or
queries y. In that case the simulator sets S = W and B = V . Note that the adversary cannot
query for s or sB since otherwise the adversary can trivially compute the session key. The value
U is set to equal either X or A depending on which of the two values the adversary does not
query for. To extract the BDH solution one uses the fact that σ0 and σ1 have different exponents
from which the multiple of uvw can be extracted even without the knowledge of y.
4 Conclusion
We presented a tripartite PKI-based and two-party ID-based key establishment schemes. The
protocols utilize ideas used to obtain efficient two-party key agreement techniques. They are
both communication and computation efficient, and provide most desirable security attributes.
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